INTRODUCTION
This paper applies a sequential Bayesian approach to the design and analysis of exper iments to test , statistically, between competing theoretical models. The basic idea is simple, and its application has been advocated by statisticians for years ; Yet, to our knowledge, this approach to the design and analysis of controlled laboratory experiments in economics has not ever been followed. We apply this approach to compare and eval uate two competing equilibrium models about learning in games, which differ in basic assumptions about how much players learn about unknown population parameters of the game they are playing.
We begin by assessing our priors over two competing models (and the specific param eters of each model). After each observation, we update our beliefs about the parameters of the competing models and reevaluate the statistical evidence for one against the other.
We continue gathering evidence until our priors are sufficiently concentrated so that we judge the value of an additional data point is not worth the cost of collecting it.
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The second kind of learning is what we call "population learning". In many economic experimental designs, especially those used to study behavior in strategic situations, each subject plays similar games against a sequence of opponents. Thus, players have an opportunity to learn about population parameters that are relevant to expectations about how a randomly drawn opponent is likely to act. This has implications about how players will play against early opponents compared to how they may play against later opponents. For example, they may adjust their strategies against early opponents in order to gather information about population parameters, which provides valuable statistical information about future opponents. We call this "strategic learning", since players are altering their strategy explicitly to affect how much they learn. This type of learning, which is familiar in search theory, has been studied by Fudenberg and Kreps (1988) in the context of repeated games.
We compare two models of learning. The first model is that individuals learn only about an opponent when they play her/him repeatedly, but do not update (about pop ulation parameters) from their experience with that opponent when they move on to play the same game with other opponents. We label this the non-sequential model. The second model is that individuals use Bayesian updating to learn about population pa rameters from each of their opponents, as well as learning about the idiosyncrasies of that particular opponent. We call that the sequential model. Our approach to studying learning over time is to treat an experimental session as one large game, instead of a collection of independent observations. Therefore, our models explicitly take into account the fact that subjects will play multiple times against multiple opponents. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium to this larger game incorporates any learning that arises from the above sources.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we wish to fi nd the solution to the full game, and to find whether the full Bayesian Nash equilibrium makes predictions that are in line with the observed regularities in the experimental data. Second, we wish to test whether such a model is more or less likely than a non-sequential model given the observed data.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we introduce the game, and lay out the particular parametrization of our models. In section 3, we describe the type of equilibrium we wish to find, and discuss the numerical methods of solving for the full Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, as well as the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the competing non-sequential model. In section 4, we discuss the experimental design that we implement and the results we obtain. In section 5, we discuss the robustness of our results to various modeling assumptins, and conclude the paper.
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THE GAME, THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN, AND OUR MODEL For a variety of reasons, the centipede game has received a great deal of attention in the last few years. Binmore (1986) gave it its name and discussed several of its interesting connections with the foundations of game theory. Rosenthal (1982) first studied it and observed its application to industrial organization. Aumann (1988) , Megiddo (1986) , Reny (1985) , McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) and others have also investigated it. The related problems of the chain-store paradox and the repeated prisoners' dilemma have extensive literatures that are too long to list here.
The game has two players, whom we call the red and blue players. In the 3-move version considered here there is a pile of money on the table. The red player gets to move first, and s/he gets to take 80% of the pile ($4.00) and leave the blue player 20%
($1.00), or s/he can pass, in which case the pile doubles and it is the blue player's turn to move. Now the blue player can take 80% of the current pile ($8.00) leaving red with $2.00 or pass, in which case the pile doubles again, and it is the red player's turn. The red player can take $16.00 and leave the blue player $4.00, or pass again. If red passes that second time that s/he gets to choose, the piles double one last time and blue gets $32.00, leaving red with $8.00 and the game ends.
By standard game theoretic reasoning, if it is common knowledge among the players that they are both selfish expected utility maximizers then a simple backward induction argument will show that the red player should take 80% of the original pile on the very first move and the game should end there. On the other hand, it has been noted by several researchers (see e.g. Binmore (1986) , Reny (1985) , Rosenthal (1982) ) that there are difficulties with the use of backward induction in the centipede game, since observance of a pass gives information about a player's rationality, and hence might serve as a signal of her/his future behavior. Further, in the presence of the slightest lack of common knowledge of rationality, it is not necessarily any longer optimal for even the rational players to take (see e.g. Aumann (1988) ). If one assumes that there is some small likelihood that the opponent misunderstood the game, or has altruistic preferences, then an argument similar to that which Kreps et al. (1982) used to explain cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma can be used to show that it may then be optimal even for a rational player to pass on early moves in the centipede game.
In addition to the theoretical arguments suggesting that one should expect some players to pass in the centipede game, McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) present some exper imental evidence showing that in fact only a small proportion of players take on the first round. McKelvey and Palfrey find some support for the explanation based on lack of common knowledge of rationality. Moreover, in the above mentioned experiments, there is evidence of regular patterns of changes in subject behavior over time.
One other point is in order before we move on to the careful statement of the game and our modeling of it. Many game theoretic models make predictions that are too precise, in the sense that their error structures are degenerate. This is the case, for example, when Bayesian Nash equilibrium behavior predicts pure strategies. In laboratory data, this means that such models assign zero likelihood to many observed outcomes. This undermines the logic of rigorous statistical analysis in the context of structural models of this genre. We call this the zero likelihood problem.
In order for a statistical analysis to be possible, it is necessary to either work with a model that admits all outcomes in the range of the data (e.g. Boylan and El-Gama! (1992) ), or discard certain data points that the model predicts will never happen (e.g. Camerer and Weigelt (1988) ). Since we would like to avoid such an ad hoc use of the data, we opt for the former approach.
We consider a four person game played in two stages. Players 1 and 2 are called red players, and players 3 and 4 are called blue players. The four players each play a sequence of two games as follows: At time 1, player 1 is matched with 3, and player 2 is matched with 4. Players 1 and 3 play the 3-move centipede game described above.
Simultaneously, players 2 and 4 play the same game. At the conclusion of the first game, each player observes the outcome and payoff of the game that they are involved in but do not observe the outcome of the other game. Then at time 2, the process is repeated, but this time player 1 is matched with player 4 and player 2 is matched with player 3.
To an economist, it might seem strange at first to have subjects play the game only twice. Indeed, it is common practice in economic experiments to discard the first few
"noisy" observations and analyze only data from later games. Since we are interested in "learning", however, it is precisely those early "noisy" data points about which we care.
Indeed, later data points will not be of much use as most of the learning would have already taken place.
In modeling the game, we let nature take a move at the beginning of the game to decide on the rationality of each of our agents. We model nature's move as a random draw which makes any particular individual an altruist with probability q. An altruistic individual is assumed to pass all the time. The agents each have a subjective belief about the value of q, and we assume that each agent i has the belief that q is distributed uniformly on the interval [O, 8;] . Moreover, even though agents may have different values 8;, they each believe that everyone else shares their own value 8;. We then model the 8;'s to be drawn uniformly over the interval [O, t] , where Eis again a parameter of nature. There is also a common knowledge trembling probability a for both rationals and altruists. A tremble is a deviation of the player from the (optimal) equilibrium behavior due to temporary confusion, or any other source of making errors. In our model, if a player trembles at any move, s/he flips a fair coin to determine her/his move.
To avoid confusion about the various parameters, let us summarize the main points of the model:
• The probability of any person being an altruist is q, and q is assumed to be an objective parameter of nature that is unknown to us as well as to the players.
• Agent i believes that q � U [O, 8;] , and believes that 8; = 8;, V j. We assume that the actual 8;'s are in fact different for different players. This heterogeneity assump tion embodies the notion that depending on the backgrounds of the subjects, they develop beliefs about the proportion of altruists in each sub-population. Players assume that everyone else in the experiment has similar beliefs about the sub population from which the experimental subjects were sampled. The assumption of uniform prior is made for simplicity of computations.
e The actual 8; 's are distributed U [O, t] , and tis assumed to be an objective parameter of nature which determines the distribution of backgrounds (and hence of 8;'s) in our pool of experimental subjects. Again the uniformity assumption is made for computational ease. The sensitivity analyses in section 5 suggest that our results are reasonably robust to that modeling assumption.
• Both rationals and altruists tremble with common knowledge probability a. This is assumed to be an objective parameter of nature that depends on the game and the subject pool from which we draw. Since our subject pool consists only of Caltech students, we assume that the complexity of the game immediately reveals to all of them the probability of "errors" being made by themselves as well as other players.
We model those "errors" as complete confusion resulting in their flipping a fair coin to determine their move. This parameter is thus assumed to be common knowledge among the players, but unknown to us.
Each of our subjects will play the game with two players. Our two models of how subjects play the game are:
The Non- in more than one session. When the participants arrived, they were seated at computer terminals with partitions that inhibit communication. They were also instructed that they should not communicate with any of the other participants at any point during the session. The participants drew an envelope at random, which informed them whether they were 'red' or 'blue'. They were told that they were either red or blue for the entire duration of the experimental session. Clear instructions were read aloud to all the par ticipants. The exact rules of the three move centipede game were explained, and subjects were informed that they were playing for real money, and would be paid exactly accord ing to the rules, in cash, immediately following the session. The matching rules were also carefully explained, namely that they would play two games with different subjects of the other color. Example outcomes were illustrated and subjects were then given a quiz to assure us of their understanding of the structure of the experiment. At the end of the session, participants were paid their cash earnings in private in a separate room.
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THE SOLUTION
For each value of the parameter a (which is assumed to be known to all players), and value of ti ;, a player's strategy is a vector of probabilities for passing at each move of the game. We first symmetrize the game by introducing an artificial chance move at the beginning of the game making each player red with probability 1/2 and blue with probability 1/2. This means that each player before the match begins must define the vector of probabilities of passing for all moves (red and blue) given her/his belief ti;, and known probability of tremble a. Note that we only need to solve for the strategy of the rational players at the nodes of the game where they do not tremble, since altruists always pass, and all players flip fair coins when they tremble. Since each player may be red or blue, and each player plays two games with different opponents, the strategy of a player (who does not tremble) with initial belief ti and when the common knowledge tremble probability is a is represented by a ten dimensional vector p( ti, a) E [O, 1 ] 1°. Where
• p 1 (ti , a)= Probability that a rational red player passes in the first move of the first game.
• p2(ti, a)= Probability that a rational blue player passes in the second move of the first game.
e For m=3,5,7,9, Pm(ti, a)= Probability that a rational red player passes in the first move of the second game, when the first game has ended in red taking on the first move (denoted T), blue taking on the second move (denoted PT), red taking on the third move (denoted PPT), or red passing on the third move (denoted PPP), respectively.
• For m=4,6,8,10, Pm(ti, a)= Probability that a rational blue player passes in the second move of the second game, when the first game has ended with a T, PT, PPT, or PPP, respectively.
So far, we have defined the strategy of a player with belief U [O, ti] , when the true probability of trembling is a. How does a player choose a strategy that is optimal in some sense? We look for a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, defi ned as the strategy p( 8, a) which maximizes the player's total expected payoff from both games if all other rational players use the same strategy p( 8, a).
A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (Harsanyi (1967-68) ) is a Nash equilibrium to a game in which there is some incomplete inf o rmation about parameters affecting the payoffs of the players (in our case the altruism of the players). In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, it is assumed that there is a joint distribution of player types which is common knowledge to the players. Each player conditions on her/his own type, and uses Bayes's rule together with her/his beliefs about the strategy of the other player to determine the conditional distribution of types of the other player, and in equilibrium, must act optimally at each decision node conditional on her/his updated priors at that node. We can alternatively consider the game as one in which player strategies are type contingent actions, and then a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is just a simple Nash equilibrium to this game. This is the approach we take below in computing the equilibrium. When one takes this approach, the updated priors do not actually have to be computed explicitly to achieve the solution, but they are implicit in the solution since they can be computed from it.
NOTES:
• We do not f o rmally include a choice f o r a red player on the last move. In equilibrium, rational red players always take on the last move of both games.
• Remember that we are assuming that all players agree on the value of a, and believe that all players agree on the value of 8. This player-specific common knowledge assumption is consistent with the original formulation of incomplete information games of Harsanyi (1967-68) . Most subsequent applied work in game theory as sumed beliefs to be objectively true, or to be derivable from a "common prior".
Neither of those assumptions is necessary in modeling games of incomplete inf o r mation.
• As stated above, we only look for a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the symmetrized game. Notice, however, that by symmetrizing the game in the way in-dicated above, every equilibrium of the original game (symmetric and asymmetric) is equivalent to some symmetric equilibrium of the symmetrized game (e.g. Selten (1983) 
The function Q:
�+ is non-negative and a zero of Q is by definition a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game. Further, Q can be shown to be everywhere differentiable (see e.g. McKelvey (1990) ). Hence, standard gradient algorithms can be used to find a solution (a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game).
Our numerical computation of the equilibrium consists of evaluating the value function v(p', p; 8 , a) and finding the fixed point as described above. For the minimization part of the algorithm, we used the Powell's method routine in Press et al. (1988) . The rest of the program was written in C and debugged on a 386 personal computer and a Sun 386i, and then ported and vectorized on a Cray XMP /18, and then a Cray YMP2E/116. We were content with bringing the function Q(.) above to less than 10 -20 at 100 values of 8
and 20 values of a (a total of 2000 grid points).
Similarly, we solve for the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the non-sequential model which is much simpler since the two probabilities of red passing on the first move and blue passing on the second should be the same for the first and second games (re gardless of the outcome of the first game). This is simply the definition of non-sequential behavior: the agent does not use the information from the first game to update her/his belief on q and choose a different set of probabilities. Hence, the non-sequential equilib rium is represented by a vector in [O, 1 ]2.
THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We begin with a prior about the relative validity of the two learning models which we represent by the prior odds ratio. We decided to start with an uninformed prior odds ratio of unity. We also begin with an uninformative prior on the three unknown (nuisance) parameters of nature q, E, and a, which is given by the uniform prior density over [O, 1] 3. Now, we collect our data with matches of 4 players where players 1 and 2 are red, and players 3 and 4 are blue. After each match, we revise our beliefs about the three nuisance parameters under each of the two models, and also revise our posterior odds ratio. Given our prior on ( q, E, a), we compute the likelihood of the two models by integrating out the nuisance parameters with respect to that prior. 
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i's moves where p"11(pass) = (1 -a) + a/2, and p"11(take) = a/2. Now, the likelihood of player i's moves conditional on the proportion of altruists being q IS like: n (match; O;, a, q) = (1 -q) · like:�"1(match; O;, a) + q · like:;';11(match; O;, a) Now, given our assumption that the o;'s are distributed U [O, E] , and integrating out (E, q, a) with respect to our prior, the full likelihood of the match can be written as: where likesn(match) = j lsn(match;E,q,a) prior (dE,dq,da) [0,1]3 lsn( match; E, q, a) = IT (1 like: n (match; D;, a, q) do;) t=l 0 Similarly, we can compute likenn(match) in the same manner for the non-sequential model, replacing the probabilities by their non-sequential counterparts.
After observing the outcome of a match, we do two updates. First, we update the posterior odds ratio on the two models by multiplying by the likelihood ratio given the match outcome. We also update our beliefs about ( E, q, a) for each of the hypotheses via Bayes's rule. Our posterior belief under SN on the nuisance parameters becomes
f lsn(match;E,q,a) przorsn (dE,dq,da) Now, we address the issue of the stopping rule. It is well known in the case of two densities (if we did not have the nuisance parameters) (e.g. see Chernoff (1972 , Ch. 11,12), S irjaev (1973 , Ch. IV.1), and Berger (1985 ) that for (0-K) loss functions (where J( is the loss if we stop sampling and select the wrong model), the sequential probability ratio test which stops when the odds ratio hits one of two boundaries is a Bayes procedure. This procedure also has the remarkable property (see any of the above references) that it stops in finite time with probability 1, and simultaneously minimizes the expected stopping time under both models among all stopping procedures with the same type I and type II error probabilities.
In the case where the two likelihood functions depend on nuisance parameters, in the tradition of Chernoff (1959) and Kiefer and Sacks (1963) , one considers asymptotically (as the cost per data point goes to zero) optimal Bayes procedures. Those procedures (Kiefer and Sacks (1963) , Lorden (1977) ) stop when the odds ratio hits one of two boundaries that depend on the cost of sampling and some information numbers. The odds ratio is the ratio of the likelihoods of the two models, where each of the likelihoods is computed under each (E, q, a) vector and then integrated with respect to our prior on those nuisance parameters.
Accordingly, we implemented the following version of the procedure: After each match, we compute the likelihood of each of the 256 possible data sets under each of the model, and calculate the Kullback-Liebler information numbers
and
By using the Wald approximation of probabilities of type I and type II error and the expected stopping time (Chernoff (1972, pp. 59-66) , Berger (1985, pp. 485-499) ), we then compute the boundaries A and B, 0 < A < 1 < B, such that we stop and accept the sequential model if our posterior odds ratio exceeds B, and stop and accept the non sequential model if our posterior odds ratio is smaller than A. Following the prescription in Berger (1985, p. 500) , an approximately optimal choice of A and B involves minimizing the approximate risk function:
with respect to A and B. We set c (the cost per unit sampled) at 0.01 , [( (the loss of selecting the wrong hypothesis) at 1; 7f denotes our prior belief on NN , and µnn and µ,n are the information numbers calculated with our priors on ( E, q, a) . Our choice of c and J( does not directly reflect the actual dollar cost of running an extra game. It reflects our preferences against the selection of the wrong hypothesis by choosing the cost (in utility terms) to be 1/lOO'h of the loss (again in utility terms) of selecting the wrong hypothesis.
Since we chose c = 0.01 << J( = 1, we use the further approximation (see previous references) for small c which yields A= -c7r /(µnn K(l -7r )), and B = 7r K µsn/( c(l -7r )).
Our stopping criteria are not necessarily optimal for a number of reasons: First, we use an approximation as c -> 0, and, second, we ignore the problem of overshooting the boundaries (Lorden (1977) ). Berger did not prove that the formulae he recommended (Berger (1985, 7.83 and 7.84, p.499) ) are optimal, but we use them since they seem to be sensible means for computing the stopping boundaries.
An alternative approach that we can follow, even though its optimality properties are unknown, is to recompute the boundaries at each point using our updated odds ratio 7r', and information numbers, µ! n and µ; n , calculated using the updated priors on the nuisance parameters. The latter procedure seems intuitively appealing since it recalculates the Bayes risk at each point using all the information to-date, and then decides whether or not to sample depending on that posterior Bayes risk. We include both the constant boundaries and the varying ones in Figure 1 . It turns out in our case that both procedures yield exactly the same result, as seen in Figure 1 .
RESULTS:
Table 1 shows the data we collected from the 19 matches in the 5 experimental sessions, and reports the posterior odds ratio for SN versus NN after each match. The posterior odds ratio is also plotted as the solid line in Figure 1 . The stopping boundaries computed a la Berger (1985, p. 500) are plotted as the two flat dashed lines in Figure   1 . If we follow the second procedure of recomputing the boundaries in each period using the current posterior odds ratio and posteriors on the nuisance parameters, we obtain the two changing boundaries shown by the gray lines in Figure 1 . After 19 matches, we stop and accept the Sequential Nash model. • We inherited the first 12 matches from an earlier version of the paper which had a different model of nature and player beliefs. Therefore, we could not pretend to be able to stop before 12 matches had passed.
• For purposes of anonymity, we wanted to have a large number of agents during an experimental session so that players will not know who is in their group of 4. As a result, we ran sessions typically with 16 subjects, with the exception of one session where we had 12 subjects. The way we order matches within an experimental session is arbitrary (according to subject number in the session). In Figure 1 , we separate the matches between laboratory session by vertical lines. Since data were gathered in batches of matches, we could only have stopped sampling at such points. The lines at 4 and 8 are gray to indicate that the first twelve matches were data inherited from the previous version of the paper.
• We plot 10 times log of base 10 of the odds ratio and stopping barriers (i.e. measured in decibels) to make the graph more symmetric, and show the variations in the lower boundary.
• • Notice that had we had our current model when we started collecting data, we would have stopped after the eighth match. Since after 12 matches our posterior odds ratio was back near 1, we continued sampling. Fortunately, the decision we make after 19 matches is the same that we would have made after 8 (accepting the sequential model).
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ROBUSTNESS AND LIMITATIONS OF OUR RESULTS:
The question may arise: how does our result of accepting the sequential model over the non-sequential one depend on the particular parametrization and distributional assump tions of the model? One can think of at least three levels at which one might consider the robustness of the results to the particular assumptions we make. These levels, going from the highest to the lowest are:
1. How robust are our results to our uniform priors we place on the nuisance param eters ( q, t, a)?
2. How robust are our results to the assumption that the true 8;'s are distributed uniformly over [O, E] for some epsilon?
3. How robust are our results to the assumption that players formulate beliefs on q using a uniform density over [O, 8;] .
The easiest to answer is the first robustness question, and the answer is that our results are robust in that respect. As can be seen from the posterior standard deviations on the nuisance parameters, the likelihood function very strongly dominates the prior. Recall that in Model 1, the mean of our posterior estimate of the average 8; is approxi mately 0.125 ( E"'" 0.25). Thus, we chose a range of alternative models that either force this posterior estimate to be lower (Model 3), or higher (Models 4 and 5). Model 2 forces the estimate of the average 8; to be 0.1, but permits the variance of the 8;'s to be different. The resulting likelihoods for the various models are shown in Table 2 below.
It turns out that the Models 2-5 all tend to nest themselves into Model 1 (by concen trating the posterior on the nuisance parameter E at 0.1 for Model 2, and at 0 for models 3-5). Now, the only remaining assumption is that regarding the way in which players for mulate priors on q. Priors on q that entertain the possibility of very low q will result in a larger proportion of takes, and priors that put most of the mass on high values of q will result in more passing. Point mass distributions on q will result in no difference between the sequential and nonsequential models. An actual sensitivity analysis is not feasible since the computation of the equilibrium for any other parametrization will cost us hun dreds more of supercomputer CPU hours. Finally, we note that the results reported here may be limited to the particular class of games that we are studying, and hence should not be interpreted as universal statements about the classes of models that we compare. 
